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Brazil  has  constantly  provided  Force  Commanders  and  is  the  largest  troop  contributor  
to   the   United  Nations   Stabilisation  Mission   in  Haiti   (MINUSTAH).   A   fair   number   of  
representatives,  including  a  Minister  of  Defence  (Zaverucha,  2008,  p.  22)  as  well  as  the  
Army  commander  (Gazeta  do  Povo,  2011),  expressed  their  desire  to  use  MINUSTAH  for  
improving  internal  military  operations.  This  has  arguably  led  to  a  “Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince-­‐‑Rio-­‐‑
connection”  (Hirst  &  Mattar  Nasser,  2014,  p.  4):  MINUSTAH  is  understood  as  origin  of  
Pacification  approaches  in  Rio  de  Janeiro,  in  which  the  military  occasionally  acts  jointly  
with  state  police  forces.  Hence,  some  suggest  that  “Armed  Forces´  actions  in  the  hills  of  
Rio   cannot   be   comprehended   without   the   prior   experience   in   Haiti”   (Marcos   Cintra  
cited  in  Mateos,  2011).  By  contrast,  a  minority  view  contends  that  MINUSTAH  probably  
has   fewer   consequences   for   public   security   than   the   other   way   round:   “Rather   than  
importing  new  doctrines   from  overseas   (...)   Brazilian   troops   export   their   conventional  
policing   roles”   (Sotomayor,   2014,   p.   89).   This   article  will   show   that   both   sides   of   the  
argument  should  be  seen  as  complementary,  not  mutually  excluding  perspectives.          
Probably   more   important   than   origins   are   the   results   from   both   types   of  
deployment.   This   article   therefore   addresses   the   close   similarity   of   MINUSTAH   and  
Pacification  at  operational  level.  I  will  argue  that  these  simultaneous  deployments  create  
reciprocal   learning   processes   among   troops.   With   the   establishment   of   dedicated  
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training   centres   and   a   considerable   amount   of   practical   experience   in   missions   that  
differ   significantly   from   traditional   combat-­‐‑orientated   warfare,   soldiers   are   becoming  
increasingly  familiar  with  police  tasks  and  frequent  interactions  with  civilians.  Based  on  
the  considerable  extension  of  the  legal  framework  for  allowing  domestic  military  actions  
that  has  begun  well  before  the  start  of  MINUSTAH,  I  will  argue  that  this  “police-­‐‑ization  
of  the  military,  (...)  a  growing  tendency  to  look  to  the  armed  forces  to  perform  tasks  that  
are,   essentially,   law  enforcement   in  nature”   (Dunlap,   1999,  p.   222)  probably  has  more  
repercussions   for   internal   “Guaranteeing   Law   and   Order”   (GLO)   missions   than   for  
further  UN  Peace  Operations.  
The   article   is   structured   as   follows:   firstly,   I   show   in   greater   detail   how  
Pacification   builds   on   prior   military   operations   as   well   as   attempts   of   community  
policing   in   favelas.   Then   I   proceed   to   an   assessment   of   the   military   participation   in  
MINUSTAH  and  GLO  operations,  in  which  I  point  out  commonalities  at  the  operational  
level.   This   leads   to   the   finding   that   internal   deployments   and   the   participation   in  
MINUSTAH  achieve  synergy  effects   in  terms  of  creating  soldiers´  skills   in  non-­‐‑combat  
tasks.   In   the   following,   I   portray   the   development   of   the   legal   framework   for   GLO  
operations.  Based  thereon,  I  elaborate  on  my  final  argument  that  capacities  attained  by  
soldiers   are  probably  going   to  have  more   repercussions   for   internal  missions   than   for  
future  Peace  Operations.  
Origins  of  the  Pacification  programme  
  
Rio  de  Janeiro´s  Pacification  programme  not  only  tries  to  tackle  violence  and  gang  rule  
over  poor  neighbourhoods,  but  was  also  supposed  to  improve  the  negative  image  of  law  
enforcement  agencies.  The  confrontational  and  often  abusive  way  the  Brazilian  police  is  
acting  like  has  been  widely  discussed,  and  arguably  makes  them  rather  a  part  than  an  








appropriate  solution  of  the  crime  problem  (for  detailed  accounts  on  police  violence,  see  
Costa,   2011;   Gay,   2009).   By   contrast,   the  Unidades   de   Polícia   Pacificadora   (UPPs)   were  
meant  to  end  structural  reasons  for  crime  by  permanently  establishing  positive  relations  
to   citizens   in   formerly   neglected   areas,   e.g.   by   carrying   out   social   assistance  
programmes.  The  actual  record  of  UPPs  has  been  rather  dubious  so  far,  which  shall  not  
be   discussed   here   at   length.   Rather,   this   article   aims   at   the   military´s   role   in   the  
programme  and  its  similarities  with  MINUSTAH.  Officialised  by  decree  in  2011  but  in  
practice  started  as  early  as  2008,  pacifying  Rio´s  favelas  comprises  four  stages:  (i)  tactical  
intervention,  (ii)  stabilisation,  (iii)  implantation  of  UPPs,  and  finally  (iv)  evaluation  and  
monitoring  (Estado  do  Rio  de  Janeiro,  2011).  Eventual  joint  actions  of  the  military  with  
police   forces   take   place   in   the   first   two   stages.   As   will   be   shown   in   this   chapter,  
Pacification  largely  builds  on  methods  that  have  been  tried  and  tested  before,  either  in  
Rio  or  outside  of  Brazil.  
Tactics  of  conquering  and  claiming  spaces  as  employed  in  Rio´s  Pacification  and  
in  Haiti  apparently  derive  from  French  counterinsurgency  doctrines  of  the  19th  century.  
According   to   these,   it   was   crucial   to   be   permanently   present   and   to   display   coercive  
power  in  contested  areas.  The  French  Pacification  approach  in  Madagascar  was  to  gain  
strongholds  deep  inside  disputed  zones  from  where  troops  gradually  advanced  towards  
peripheral   regions   (Rid,   2010,  p.   750).  The  Colombian  city  of  Medellín  applied   similar  
approaches   for  bringing   slums  under  governmental   control:   in   2002,   security   agencies  
forcefully  entered  the  Comuna  13  neighbourhood  and  expelled  guerrilla  groups.  Then,  
they   established   a   permanent   stronghold   within   this   area,   from   which   the   ensuing  
provision  of  elementary  state  services  was  carried  out  (Rötzsch,  2011).    
The   early   stages   of   MINUSTAH  mimicked   this   strategy   with   the   “progressive  
occupation”  (Aguilar,  2012,  p.  231)  of  one  gang-­‐‑controlled  slum  in  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince  after  
another.  A  main  feature  therein  has  been  the  establishment  of  pontos  fortes  (strongholds):  








troops   tried   to  conquer  strategically  and  symbolically  well   situated  buildings   in  gang-­‐‑
controlled  neighbourhoods,  which  they  would  then  use  as  base  for  claiming  a  disputed  
area  by  frequent  patrols  (Dorn,  2009,  p.  814).  The  Brazilian  Force  Commander  General  
Heleno  Pereira  introduced  the  concept  in  the  first  year  of  the  mission  (Silva,  2014,  p.  8)  
and  MINUSTAH´s  military  component  regularly  started  to  rely  on  pontos  fortes  from  the  
beginning  of  2007  (Cockayne,  2014,  p.  752).  Rio´s  Polícia  Militar  (PMERJ)  reportedly  sent  
a   delegation   to   Haiti   in   order   to   assess   the   potential   use   of   pontos   fortes   (C.A.   de  M.  
Cavalcanti,  2014a).  In  Rio´s  first  Pacification  effort  in  2008,  the  PMERJ  special  operations  
battalion   BOPE   indeed   took   over   a   fortified   gang-­‐‑stronghold   in   Santa  Marta  which   it  
then  used  as  base   for   establishing  permanent   control   over   the   area   (Moulin  Aguiar  &  
Ribeiro,   2013,   p.   24).   Thus,   the   military´s   experience   in   Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince   could   be  
interpreted  as  point  of  origin  for  tactics  used  in  Rio.    
Yet,   the   Brazilian   Armed   Forces   had   experimented   with   similar   concepts   and  
contributed   to   Rio´s   public   security   well   before   leading   the   military   component   of  
MINUSTAH.   During   the   UN   Earth   Summit   in   1992,   troops   performed   visible   police  
tasks   throughout   the   city.   Two   years   later,   approximately   1,500   soldiers   invaded   and  
occupied  more   than   50   favelas   for   two  months  during  Operação  Rio   (Bertazzo,   2012,   p.  
814).  A  widely  unknown,  almost  one  year-­‐‑long  occupation  of  the  small  Parque  Roquete  
Pinto   neighbourhood   between   1994   and   1995   already   employed   tactics   that   are  
nowadays   central   elements   of   Pacification   and  MINUSTAH.   Similar   to   the   ponto   forte  
concept,   soldiers  established  a  permanent   stronghold  as  base   for   regular  and   frequent  
patrols.   Moreover,   elementary   health   and   social   services   were   provided   to   the  
population.   In   resemblance   to   Pacification,   the   control   over   the   area   was   later  
ceremonially   handed   to   PMERJ.   According   to   the   current   3rd   subchefe   of   the   Land  
Operations   Command,   back   then   Operations   Officer   of   the   involved   Battalion,   a  
difference   to   today   was   that   soldiers   had   to   undergo   a   learning-­‐‑by-­‐‑doing   process   as  








there  was  no  doctrine  or  prior  experience  of   staying   in  an  area   for   that   long   (Glaucio,  
2014).    
Another   central   attribute   of   Pacification,   the   idea   of   establishing   positive   links  
between  police  and  citizens,   is  not   really  an   innovation  but  dates  back   to   times  of   the  
military   regime.  The  Centro   Integrado   de  Policiamento  Comunitário,   inaugurated   in   1983,  
has  reportedly  been  the  first  community  policing  experience  for  PMERJ  (Ribeiro,  2014,  
p.  290).  At  the  turn  of  the  century,  the  undersecretary  of  public  security  Luiz  Eduardo  
Soares  oversaw  the  first  comprehensive  approach  of  tackling  structural  problems  within  
Rio´s   police   forces   as   well   as   stepping   up   community   policing   models.   As   such,   the  
Grupamento  de  Policiamento  em  Áreas  Especiais   (GPAE)  carried  out   joint  social  assistance  
actions  with   the  NGO  Viva  Rio   (Frühling,  2012,  p.  82),   something   the  Brazilian  Armed  
Forces   later  repeated   in  Haiti.  Being  weakly   financed  and  supported  half-­‐‑heartedly  by  
authorities,   these   attempts   did   not   sustainably   alter   public   security   provision   in   Rio.  
Fierce   resistance   among   police   officers   that   eventually   surmounted   to   sabotage  
contributed   to   the   ultimate   failure   of   Soares´   reform   agenda   (Hinton,   2006,   p.   144).  
Current   UPPs   may   not   have   ended   the   police   forces´   unwillingness   to   reform   but  
crucially   differ   from   their   predecessors   in   two   aspects:   political   support   as   well   as  
financial  resources.  The  programme  is  a  central  element  of  the  state´s  security  campaign  
in   the   run-­‐‑up   to   major   international   events   such   as   the   Olympic   Games   2016.   The  
numbers   of   participating   officers   exceeds   by   far   prior   attempts.   For   instance,   GPAE  
initially  only  had  100  men  out  of  33,000  state  police  officers  at  its  disposal  (BBC  News,  
2001).  The  goal  for  UPPs  was  to  have  12,000  out  of  49,000  officers  (Foley,  2014,  p.  7).  The  
programme   further   counts   on   financial   support   from   PRONASCI,   the   federal  
government´s  flagship  programme  for  higher  investments  in  public  security  (Macaulay,  
2012,  p.  825).    








In   sum,   it   is   exaggerated   to   speak   of   MINUSTAH   as   direct   inspiration   for  
Pacification.   Strategic   and   tactical   approaches  were   used   at   the   domestic   level   before  
and  it  seems  that  the  mission  in  Haiti  has  rather  been  an  opportunity  to  apply  and  refine  
them   on   a   large   scale.   In   order   to   find   out   what   this   means   for   current   and   future  
missions,  I  would  suggest  that  it  is  more  important  to  look  at  the  consequences  than  the  
origins  of  this  relationship.  Especially  for  the  military,  operational  similarities  between  
MINUSTAH  and  Pacification  clearly  exist.  As  will  be   shown   in   the   following  chapter,  
common   profiles   of   missions   are   creating   synergy   effects   in   terms   of   training,  
experience,  and  doctrines.    
Synergy  effects  between  MINUSTAH  and  domestic  operations    
  
Contrary   to   many   armies   of   the   Global   North,   Brazilian   troops   are   used   to   intense  
interactions  with  civilians.  They  are  regularly  carrying  out  so-­‐‑called  civil-­‐‑social  actions  
(ACISO)  in  remote  parts  of  the  country  where  the  state  would  otherwise  not  be  able  to  
provide  basic  health  and  social  services  (Cerqueira,  2013,  p.  94).  A  direct  transfer  of  this  
background   to   Haiti   are   the   Brazilian   Engineering   Company   BRAENGCOY,   which  
plays   a   crucial   role   in  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince´s   infrastructure  development,   and   the  numerous  
ACISO  being  conducted  by  the  Brazilian  Infantry  Battalion  BRABAT  (Aguilar,  2012,  p.  
231).   The   dominant   role   in   MINUSTAH   is   not   only   deeply   related   to   the   military´s  
previous   social   assistance   programmes   but   also   to   repeated   engagements   in   public  
security  missions,  particularly  regarding  the  experience  of  dealing  with  gang  violence  in  
poor  urban  environments  (Kenkel,  2010,  p.  653).  From  the  start  of   the  mission  in  2004,  
Brazil´s  Area  of  Responsibility  (AOR)  in  Haiti  fittingly  comprised  gang-­‐‑controlled  slums  
in  the  capital  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince,  such  as  Cité  Soleil  or  Cité  Militaire.  Being  experienced  with  
similar   challenges   and   operational   surroundings,   the   Brazilian   contingents   took   their  








leadership   in  MINUSTAH  very   seriously   and  did   not   see   themselves   in   a   position   of  
having   to   learn   from   fellow   troop   contributors.   They   rather   thought   their   abilities   of  
engaging  positively  with  the  populace  should  teach  others  how  to  successfully  conduct  
a   Peace   Operation   (Sotomayor,   2014,   p.   138).   Despite   their   supposed   suitability,  
Brazilian   soldiers   had   to   be   additionally   prepared   for   the   challenges   during  
MINUSTAH.   Likewise,   the   growing   engagement   in   internal   public   security   required  
efforts  to  increase  soldiers´  skills  in  non-­‐‑combat  tasks.  In  this  sense,  I  suggest  that  both  
types  of  deployments  created  synergy  effects  in  terms  of  training.    
MINUSTAH  triggered  significant   improvements   in   the  professional  preparation  
for   multidimensional   missions.   In   2005,   the   Army   founded   its   peacekeeping   training  
centre  CI  Op  Paz  and  the  Navy  followed  suit  in  2008.  In  2010,  these  were  merged  into  
the  Centro  Conjunto  de  Operações  de  Paz  do  Brasil  (CCOPAB),  which  now  trains  members  
of  all   three  military  branches  as  well   as   civilians,  police   forces  and  even   some   foreign  
soldiers.   The   centre   now   annually   hosts   between   3,000   and   3,300   officers,   who  
afterwards   return   to   their   home   units   for   instructing   their   respective   subordinates.  
Shortly   before   being   deployed,   the   entire   contingent   takes   part   in   a   Pre-­‐‑Deployment  
Field   Exercise,   which   simulates   possible   situations   in   Haiti   (Vendramin,   2014).  
Familiarising  with  UN  principles,  rules  of  engagement  and  awareness  for  human  rights  
issues   are   part   of   CCOPAB´s   curriculum.   Aside   from   this,   Brazil   has   considerable  
leeway  in  designing  practical  exercises,  as  the  UN  does  not  issue  compulsory  guidelines  
on   how   to   conduct   operational   training   (Sotomayor,   2014,   p.   98).   There   is   not   much  
fantasy   needed   to   imagine   how   the   training   –   stopping   and   searching   cars,   collecting  
evidence  at  crime  scenes,  joint  patrols  with  police  forces  -­‐‑  as  well  as  some  of  the  training  
grounds   (e.g.   shacks  built  on  a   steep  slope)   I  have  witnessed  at  CCOPAB   in  February  
2014   instill   operational   capabilities   that   are   equally   useful   for   MINUSTAH   or   just  
another  mission  in  Rio´s  favelas.    








Almost  concurrently  with  establishing  CI  Op  Paz,  the  Army  founded  the  Centro  
de   Instrução   de   Operações   de   Garantia   da   Lei   e   da   Ordem   (CI   Op   GLO).   This   institution  
prepares  soldiers  for  actions  in  favelas,  during  police  strikes  and  other  GLO  operations.  It  
follows  the  principle  of  training  the  trainers  as  used  at  CCOPAB:  sergeants  and  officers  
spend  one  week  at  CI  Op  GLO  before  instructing  their  subordinates  (Stochero,  2012).  Its  
initial   instruction   manual   acknowledges   that   troops   needed   specialised   training   for  
acting   adequately   during   disturbances   of   public   order.   Moreover,   it   highlights   how  
crucial  principles  of  proportionality  and   reasonable  use  of   force  are   (Brasil.  Ministério  
da   Defesa,   2005,   pp.   1,   6).   In   terms   of   doctrine,   GLO   operations   constitute   a   crucial  
difference   to   combat-­‐‑orientated   military   missions.   Nevertheless,   the   CI   Op   GLO  
commander  insisted  that  “we  cannot  lose  our  intrinsic  character  as  an  Army.  We  are  not  
the   police.”   (Coronel   Schubert   Ferreira,   cited   in   Stochero   2012).   Consequently,   CI  Op  
GLO  is  trying  to  strike  the  balance  between  implementing  skills  necessary  for  policing  
and   other   GLO   tasks   without   harming   competences   attained   during   basic   military  
training.   Such   a   combination   of   capabilities   is   commonly   regarded   as   necessary   for  
successful  conduct  in  Peace  Operations  (Caforio,  2007,  p.  90),  in  which  questions  of  law  
enforcement   are   a  major   challenge   for   soldiers   (Hills,   2001,   p.   80).  Hence,   training   for  
GLO   achieves   synergy   effects   in   creating   capabilities   that   are   equally   helpful   for   UN  
missions.  
Apart  from  training,  the  practical  experience  gained  in  both  missions  equally  has  
reciprocal  effects.   In   the  early  phases  of  MINUSTAH,  soldiers  were  heavily  relying  on  
combat   skills   in  order   to   end  gang   rule  over  various   slums  of  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince.  Tactical  
successes   came   along   with   casualties   among   the   civilian   population   as   troops   were  
apparently  using  inappropriate  levels  of  force.  Yet,  Force  Commanders  learnt  from  these  
mistakes   and   subsequently   managed   to   significantly   reduce   civilian   victims   (for   a  
detailed   overview   of  military   operations   between   2004   and   2007,   see  Cockayne,   2014;  








Dorn,  2009;  Dziedzic  &  Perito,   2008).  After  ending  gang  domination,  BRABAT  mainly  
focused   on   police   tasks   like   patrolling,   search-­‐‑and-­‐‑seizure   operations   or   establishing  
checkpoints.   Furthermore,   inter-­‐‑agency   co-­‐‑operation   with   NGOs,   police   forces   and  
international   agencies   became   increasingly   relevant,   especially   in   the   aftermath   of   the  
earthquake   in   2010   (C.A.   de   M.   Cavalcanti,   2014b,   p.   12).   At   times,   Brazilian   troops  
ended  up  being  the  only  security  providers  in  areas  such  as  Cité  Soleil,  where  UN  police  
forces  (UNPOL)  and  the  Haitian  National  Police  (PNH)  did  not  dare  to  enter.   In  other  
neighbourhoods   where   they   eventually   carried   out   joint   patrols   with   PNH,   soldiers  
compared   the   tasks   to  GLO  operations   in  Brazil   (J.B.  da  Cunha,  2008,  p.  86).  With   the  
envisaged   end   of   MINUSTAH,   Haitian   institutions   should   now   gradually   be   taking  
charge  of  public  security.  Yet,  the  PNH  suffers  from  a  lack  of  resources,  corruption  and  
severe  distrust  from  the  populace  (Dziedzic  &  Perito,  2008,  p.  2).  In  recent  years,  a  surge  
in  criminal  violence  as  well  as  allegations  of  police  misconduct  massively  undermined  
any  advances  made  in  terms  of  building  confidence  amongst  urban  dwellers  (Kolbe  &  
Muggah,  2012,  p.  6).  Despite  MINUSTAH  currently  having  the  second  largest  UNPOL-­‐‑
contingent   with   almost   2,500   officers   (UNDPKO,   2014),   this   multinational   force   is  
equally  not  able  to  provide  the  bulk  of  public  security.  Haitian  citizens  have  reasonable  
doubts   about   their   suitability   because   most   officers   stem   from   countries   with  
problematic   human   rights   records.   Furthermore,   there   is   a   huge   language   barrier  
between  many  UNPOL  officers  and  the  local  population  (Gauthier  &  Bonin,  2008,  p.  9).  
Officially,  UN  troops  are  now  only  the  third  resort,  after  PNH  and  UNPOL,  for  rapidly  
reacting  to  security  incidents  (Cerqueira,  2014,  p.  19).  In  practice,  however,  BRABAT  still  
outnumbers  and  outperforms   these  police   forces,   is  being  used  as   first   resort   in  many  
cases  and  keeps  on  doing  ostensible  policing  in  its  AOR.  With  the  proposed  reduction  of  
military  personnel,  BRABAT  is  going  to  be  reduced  to  a  Quick  Reaction  Force  and  will  
necessarily   have   to   reduce   this   scope   (Martinelli,   2014).   Summing   up   the   experience  








gained   in   Haiti,   early   BRABAT-­‐‑contingents   underwent   remarkable   levels   of   “live-­‐‑
combat  training”  (Sánchez  Nieto,  2012,  p.  168)  in  urban  warfare  that  would  help  prepare  
them  for  similar  missions  in  the  future.  Later  contingents  were  much  more  involved  in  
police-­‐‑style  operations  and  confidence  building   interactions  with   the  populace   than   in  
combat   operations.   In   this   sense,   MINUSTAH   also   served   as   “live-­‐‑law   enforcement  
training”  that  would  be  useful  for  current  domestic  deployments.    
Members   of   the   Armed   Forces   repeatedly   stress   that   rules   of   engagement   in  
Pacification  and  other  GLO  operations  are  much  more   restricted   than   in  MINUSTAH.  
Still,  they  also  admit  that  there  is  a  “grey  zone”  (C.A.  de  M.  Cavalcanti,  2014a)  of  similar  
actions.  Therein,   the   joint   intervention  of  police  and  military  units   in  Vila  Cruzeiro   in  
2010   is   arguably   the   only   episode   of   Pacification   that   resembled   the   intense   combat  
operations   of  MINUSTAH   before   2007.   Deplorably,   dozens   of   bystanders  were   killed  
during  this  incursion  (Sotomayor,  2014,  p.  88).  Troops  responsible  for  these  initial  stages  
of   Operação   Arcanjo   were   also   deployed   in   the   critical   stages   of   MINUSTAH.   The  
commander,  General   Sardenberg,   took  part   in   the   first   Brazilian   contingent   and  more  
than  half  of  the  800  members  of  the  Brigada  de  Infantaria  Paraquedista  were  Haiti  veterans  
(Araújo,   2010a,   2010b).   Most   parts   of   Pacification   were   and   are   much   less   combat-­‐‑
orientated  and  include  typical  police  tasks:  during  Operação  Arcanjo,  8,764  Army  soldiers  
carried  out  63,489  patrols  by  foot,  48,142  by  vehicle  and  over  4,000  road  blocks  between  
December   2010   and   June   2012   (Defesanet,   2012).   Similarly   to  MINUSTAH   after   2007,  
soldiers   are   heavily   engaged   in   typical   police   tasks   and   in   frequent   contact   with   the  
populace.  Fittingly,  the  11th  Light  Infantry  Brigade  twice  constituted  a  troop  contingent.  
Several  years  before  the  Pacification  programme,  the  Army  had  already  specialised  this  
brigade   for  GLO   operations   and   altered   the   unit´s   structure   and   training   accordingly  
(Defesanet,  2005).  Members  of  this  brigade  took  part  in  MINUSTAH  shortly  before  the  
mission  in  Rio  (Gazeta  do  Povo,  2009).    








Synergy  effects   in   terms  of   learning   to  cope  with   law  enforcement   tasks  are  not  
uniformly  taking  place  from  Haiti   to  GLO  but  also  the  other  way  round,  as  confirmed  
by   an   Army   Major   who   perceived   Pacification   as   intense   training   for   MINUSTAH  
(Garcia,  2014).  A  small  survey  among  23  lower-­‐‑ranked  soldiers  that  took  part  in  the  8th  
contingent  in  Haiti  (thus  after  the  most  coercive  phase)  and  pre-­‐‑Pacification  missions  in  
Rio  concluded  that  the  experience  in  MINUSTAH  was  helpful  for  GLO  operations,  most  
importantly   with   regard   to   preparing   for   frequent   contacts   with   the   population  
(Oliveira,   2009,   p.   27).   Due   to   the   Brazilian   principle   of   sending   rotating   troop  
contingents  from  the  entire  country  to  MINUSTAH  and  not  to  dedicate  few  brigades  as  
specialists  for  Peace  Operations,  the  knowledge  gained  (and  thus  the  synergy  effects  in  
terms   of   capabilities   for   GLO)   is  widely   disseminated   among   the  Armed   Forces.   The  
Army´s  personnel  department  has  so  far  not  answered  my  inquiry  for  exact  number  of  
soldiers  that  have  taken  part  in  both  types  of  missions.  However,  the  available  literature  
and  media  coverage  suggest  that  between  sixty  (Araújo,  2010a)  and  up  to  ninety  percent  
of   soldiers   (Kenkel,   2013,   p.   194)   participating   in   Rio´s   Pacification   also   have   gained  
experience  in  Haiti.    
Similarities   between   missions   in   Haiti   and   Rio   are   finally   affecting   military  
doctrine.   According   to   Army   members,   MINUSTAH   requires   the   same   “tactics,  
techniques  and  proceedings”  as  GLO  (Pinheiro,  2009,  p.  7).  The  actions  of   the   first   six  
Brazilian  MINUSTAH  contingents  thus  followed  domestic  GLO  guidelines  for  pacifying  
an  area  (J.B.  da  Cunha,  2008,  p.  85).  Synergy  effects  arise  in  the  sense  that  the  Brazilian  
Armed   Forces   are   taking   these   common   requirements   into   account   when   developing  
new  doctrines.  In  2013,  the  Army´s  General  Staff  has  issued  the  operational  concept  of  
Operações  no  Amplo  Espectro  (Full  Spectrum  Operations)  that  was  meant  to  adjust  formal  
doctrines  to  the  changing  reality  of  deployments  abroad  and  in  Brazil  (do  Nascimento,  
2013,  p.  9).  Pacification  missions  are  considered  to  be  a  central  element  of  Full  Spectrum  








Operations   (Brasil.   Ministério   da   Defesa,   2014a,   4–18)   and   will   soon   be   guided   by   a  
dedicated   Field   Manual   (Brasil.   Ministério   da   Defesa,   2015).   The   GLO   Manuals   of  
2013/2014   (Brasil.  Ministério   da   Defesa,   2013,   2014b)   further   delineate   conditions   and  
practices   of   domestic   military   actions.   In   sum,   synergy   effects   arise   from   training,  
experience  and  doctrine  development  in  both  types  of  missions.  This   is   likely  going  to  
affect  soldiers´  capabilities  for  future  deployments,  particularly  with  regard  to  carrying  
out  non-­‐‑combat  tasks  in  law  enforcement.  
The  expansion  of  internal  military  deployments  
  
The   question   is  where   the  Brazilian  military´s   capabilities   of   acting   as   replacement   or  
supporters   of  police   forces   are  going   to  be  used.   In   this   chapter,   I  will   show  why   the  
synergy   effects   achieved   by   MINUSTAH   and   GLO   are   going   to   have   significant  
repercussions   for   public   security   provision   within   Brazil.   There,   the   “willingness   to  
blend  police  and  military  functions”  (Reames,  2007,  p.  73)  has  been  paving  the  way  for  a  
growing  use  of  troops  in  internal  operations.    
According   to   the   1988  Constitution,   five   institutions  have   the   task  of  providing  
public  security:  the  Federal  Police,  the  federal  Highway  and  Railway  Polices,  the  state-­‐‑
level   Polícia   Civil   as   well   as   the   state-­‐‑level   Polícia   Militar   (and   firefighters   that   are  
formally   attached   to   the   latter).  As   the  Polícia   Federal´s   task   is  mostly   concentrated  on  
border   control   and   due   to   the   very   restricted   responsibility   of   highway   and   railroad  
police,   the  bulk  of  work   is  being  done  by   the   investigative  Polícia  Civil   and   the  Polícia  
Militar,  which  has   to  perform   the  visible  parts  of  policing   like  patrols,   arrests   and   the  
general   control   of   public   order.   For   readers   unfamiliar  with   this   complex   system,   the  
connection   between   Armed   Forces   and   Polícia   Militar   needs   to   be   clarified.   The  
equivalent  of  what  is  commonly  understood  as  Military  Police  is  the  Polícia  do  Exército  in  








Brazil,   not   the   Polícia   Militar.   Officers   of   the   latter   officially   count   as   reserve   and  
auxiliary   troops   of   the   Army   (CEEEx,   2007,   p.   16).   Nevertheless,   their   relationship   is  
tense.  Some  members  of  the  military  believe  that  the  popular  demand  for  their  internal  
deployments   is   rooted   in   many   police   officers´   bad   behaviour,   ineffectiveness,   and  
corruption  (CEEEx,  2007,  p.  3).  Despite  the  Polícia  Militar  is  part  of  the  federal  structure  
of  the  Army  and  formally  overseen  by  the  military  Land  Operations  Command  COTER,  
these  police   forces  are  politically   subordinate   to   their   respective  state  governments,  or  
more   precisely   the   State   Secretary   of   Public   Security   (Husain,   2009,   p.   48).   Brazil´s  
federative   pact   thus   establishes   single   states   as   main   responsible   bodies   for   public  
security.  Hence,  when  talking  about  the  Polícia  Militar  in  Brazil,  it  needs  to  be  considered  
that  their  respective  origins,  structures  and  behaviour  may  vary  significantly  from  state  
to  state.    
Consequently,   the   power   of   federal   governments   in   public   security   is  
constitutionally  restricted.  By  creating  the  Força  Nacional  de  Segurança  Pública  (FNSP)  as  
an  additional  federal  police  force  in  2004,  the  Partido  dos  Trabalhadores  (PT)  government  
has  attempted   to   increase   the  União´s   leeway   (Macaulay,  2012).  Members  of   the  FNSP  
are  recruited  from  the  Polícia  Militar  and  its  effectiveness  thus  depends  on  the  consent  of  
state   governments   to   provide   it   with   officers.   Moreover,   establishing   the   FNSP   as  
permanent   public   security   agency   to   be   maintained   by   the   União   requires   a  
constitutional   amendment   that   is   currently   being   held   in   Congress   (Barros,   2014).   In  
contrast   to   their   reluctance   towards   police   reform   and   the   unwillingness   to   ask   for  
actions   of   the   FNSP,   state   governments   are   frequently   requesting   federal   military  
assistance   in   supposed   public   security   crises.  Members   of   the   Armed   Forces   and   the  
Ministry  of  Defence  have  criticised  that  governors  are  even  trivialising  these  requests  for  
GLO  operations  (H.  Cavalcanti,  2014).    








Article  142  of  the  1988  Constitution  foresees  the  military´s  role  in  the  “guarantee  
of  law  and  order”  upon  the  initiative  of  any  constitutional  power  (which  includes  state  
governments).  Lei  Complementar   (LC)  69  of  1991  states   that  Armed  Forces  may  only  be  
used   in   GLO   if   ordinary   police   forces   proved   to   be   incapable   of   securing   order.   The  
amending  LC  97  of  1999  substantiated  the  authority  of  the  executive  branch  in  ordering  
such   deployments   (for   LC   69,   LC   97   and   subsequent   amendments,   see   Brasil.  
Presidência   da   República,   1999).   While   it   is   state   governments   that   are   increasingly  
requesting   such  use  of   troops,   it  ultimately  depends  on   the  President  whether   a  GLO  
operation  can  take  place  or  not.  Hence,  eventual  criticism  regarding  an  exaggerated  use  
of   troops   in   public   security   should   not   spare   federal   governments,   which   have  
constantly  widened  the  scope  of  GLO  regulations  since  the  return  to  democracy.  After  
the  unprecedented  level  of  51  GLO  operations  taking  place   in  the  years  1999  and  2000  
alone  (Brasil.  Ministério  da  Defesa,  2005,  p.  4),  legislation  further  bolstered  this  growth.  
In  August  2001,  decree  no.  3897  entitled  the  military  command  to  take  over  the  partial  or  
entire   operational   control   of   state   police   forces   involved   in   GLO   operations.   It   also  
expanded  the  possibility  of  invoking  a  GLO  from  a  means  of  last  resort  to  situations  in  
which   it   can   be   “presumed   that   a   disturbance   of   public   order   is   possible”   (Brasil.  
Presidência  da  República,  2001,  Art.  5).  Moreover,  the  decree  conceded  police  powers  to  
the   Army   during   GLO   operations,   which   some   have   interpreted   as   breach   of  
constitutional   rulings   on   public   security   (Pereira,   2008,   p.   62).   Notwithstanding   this,  
President  Lula  extended  these  rights  to  Navy  and  Air  Force  shortly  before  leaving  office  
(Bertazzo,  2012,  p.  814).    
A  further  significant  episode  for  understanding  current  GLO  took  place  in  2008.  
The  Army  entered  the  Morro  da  Providência  in  Rio  and  planned  to  occupy  the  area  for  
an  entire  year.  The  tactics  used  were  supposed  to  be  the  same  as   in  Haiti,  with  troops  
providing   social   services   and   interacting   closely  with   the   populace   (O   Estado   de   São  








Paulo,   2007).  During   this  operation,   a   soldier  handed  alleged  criminals  over   to  a   rival  
gang,   which   finally   tortured   and   killed   the   three   youths.   In   the   aftermath   of   this  
incident,  it  became  clear  that  the  mission  apparently  did  not  follow  prescribed  rules  for  
GLO.   Parts   of   the   Army   tried   to   declare   the   mission   as   case   of   ACISO,   while   the  
president   of   the   Clube   Militar   (an   association   mostly   consisting   of   retired   officers)  
blamed   federal   authorities   for   the   lack   of   legal   clarity.   By   contrast,   a   parliamentary  
commission  inferred  that   the  military  had  planned  to  act  as  police  force  from  the  start  
(Martins   Filho,   2010,   p.   294).   This   led  military   circles   to   lament   over   soldiers´   unclear  
juridical  status  in  public  security  operations.  There  are  suggestions  that  the  Army  only  
consented   to   participate   in   pacifying   Rio´s   favela-­‐‑complexes   Alemão   and   Penha   in  
November  2010  after  being  assured  that  possible  cases  of  soldiers´  misbehaviour  would  
not  be  tried  by  civilian  courts  again  (Amorim  Neto,  2014,  p.  19).  In  the  aftermath  of  the  
incidents   in   the  Morro  da  Providência,  Defence  Minister   Jobim  already  proposed   that  
soldiers   had   to   enjoy   similar   legal   protection   as   during  MINUSTAH   (Glycerio,   2008).  
This   proposal   certainly   represented   the   military´s   interest,   but   has   problematical  
connotations.   In  general,   soldiers   in  UN  Peace  Operations   enjoy  a   juridical   status   that  
makes   them   almost   immune   to   any   criminal   prosecutions   (Odello,   2010).   So   far,   only  
five   legal   proceedings   and   one   conviction   in   military   courts   were   related   to   the  
misconduct  of  Brazilian  soldiers  in  MINUSTAH  (Palma,  2015,  p.  32).  Yet,  some  associate  
this   low   figure   with   MINUSTAH´s   regulations   which   ensure   that   civil   actions   are  
subject   to   the   Force   Commander´s   approval.   As   this   role   is   constantly   performed   by  
Brazilians,   there  are   suggestions   that  Force  Commanders  were  willingly  not   reporting  
misbehaviour  of  compatriots  in  order  to  protect  the  Armed  Forces´  prestige  (Sotomayor,  
2014,   p.   142).  Whether   these   allegations   are   true   or   not,   they   bring   to  mind   that   such  
concentration  of  powers  eventually  poses  problems  of  accountability.  Still,  Article  15,  §7  
of   LC   136,   passed   in   August   2010,   ensured   that   the   Military   Penal   Code   was   valid  








during   soldiers´   actions   in   GLO   operations   (Brasil.   Presidência   da   República,   2010).  
Hence,   all   crimes   committed   by   troops   during   GLO   operations   –   except   “malicious  
crime   against   human   life”   –   have   to   be   judged   by   federal  military   courts.  With   these  
legal   guarantees   in   place,   the   Armed   Forces   have   furthermore   made   great   efforts   to  
prevent   soldiers   from  becoming   involved   in   corruption  or   other  misbehaviour  during  
Rio´s  Pacification,  for  instance  by  frequent  troop  rotations.    
In   sum,   the   legal   framework   foresees   soldiers   exercising   law  enforcement   tasks  
during  GLO  operations.  These  are  only  allowed  episodically  and  have  to  be  carried  out  
in   a   determined   frame   of   time   and   space.   Yet,   the   scope   of  Operação   Arcanjo   clearly  
marked  a  change  in  this  regard.  Up  to  this  point  of  time,  GLO  operations  usually  ended  
after  two  months  at  the  latest  (Samset,  2014,  p.  13).  By  contrast,  the  mission  in  Alemão  
and  Penha  turned  out  to  last  more  than  eighteen  months.  The  ongoing  operation  in  the  
Complexo  da  Maré   is   heading   towards   a   similar   scope.   Starting   in  April   2014,   it  was  
supposed   to   end   after   the   Football   World   Cup   but   upon   request   of   Rio´s   state  
government,   the   mandate   has   been   extended   three   times   within   eight   months.   The  
recent  prolongation  foresees  that  PMERJ  shall  be  starting  to  replace  soldiers  in  May  2015  
(Portal   Brasil,   2015).   Although   decree   3897   of   2001   restricts   GLO   operations   to   the  
shortest   possible   duration,   the   extended   length   during   Pacification   shows   the   wide  
interpretative   leeway   for   decision-­‐‑makers.   The   recent   Football   World   Cup   further  
illustrates   the   significance   of   political  will:   after   a  minor   incident   in  which   the   police  
failed   to   deter   protestors   from   blocking   the   bus   of   Brazil´s   squad,   the   government  
invoked   a   “preventive”  GLO   clause   for   the   duration   of   the   tournament.   Troops  were  
consequently  protecting  airports,  hotels  as  well  as  streets  used  by  football  teams,  foreign  
government  and  FIFA  officials  (Werneck,  2014).    








Discussion  and  outlook  
  
The  military   contribution   in  Pacification   is   not   only   inspired  by  MINUSTAH  but   also  
previous  domestic  engagements.  Nevertheless,  the  Armed  Forces  are  clearly  making  use  
of   their   leading   role   in  MINUSTAH.   I   suggest   that   the  engagements   in  Port-­‐‑au-­‐‑Prince  
and  Rio  simultaneously  serve  to  refine  and  improve  home-­‐‑grown  doctrines  and  tactics.  
As   a   result,   soldiers   in   both   types   of   missions   are   increasingly   getting   used   to  
multidimensional  missions,  not  the  least  with  regard  to  exercising  police  tasks.  For  the  
near   future,   I  would   argue   that   the   gained   skills   are   going   to   be  more   important   for  
internal  missions  than  Peace  Operations.  MINUSTAH  is  about  to  end  and  Brazil  is  still  
involved  in  several  UN  missions,  e.g.  as  leader  of  the  maritime  task  force  patrolling  the  
Lebanese   coastline.   Former   MINUSTAH   Force   Commander   General   Santos   Cruz   is  
currently   occupying   the   same   position   in   the   UN   mission   in   the   DR   Congo.   Senior  
officials  from  the  UN  Department  of  Peacekeeping  Operations  (UNDPKO)  highly  value  
the   Brazilian   approach   and   have   encouraged   further   significant   contributions   (Puff,  
2014b).   Still,   the   leading   role   in  MINUSTAH  was   closely   related   to   the   foreign  policy  
activism  of   the  Lula   administration.  By   contrast,   the   re-­‐‑elected  President  Rousseff   has  
taken  on  a  decidedly  low  profile  in  foreign  affairs  and  even  announced  massive  budget  
cuts   for   the   Foreign   Office   Itamaraty   (Stuenkel,   2014).   While   Brazil   has   increased   its  
financial  contributions  to  the  UNDPKO  for  the  current  budget  period  (Santos  &  Cravo,  
2014,  p.  5),  a  continuing  engagement  with  troops  at  the  present  level  is  far  from  certain.  
Itamaraty,  the  Armed  Forces  as  well  as  the  Ministry  of  Defence  all  favour  to  maintain  an  
important   role   in   Peace  Operations,   but   senior   officers   of  CCOPAB   acknowledge   that  
the   scope   of   upcoming   contributions   to   Peace   Operations   is   currently   unclear  
(Vendramin,  2014).    








By  contrast,   there  appear   to  be   fewer  uncertainties  when   it   comes   to   the  use  of  
troops   in  GLO  operations.  Even  before   the  start  of  MINUSTAH  and  Rio´s  Pacification  
programme,   a  General   suggested   that   the  Army  needed   to   prepare   for   the   upcoming  
“semi-­‐‑permanent”   (Speech   of   General   Alberto   Mendes   Cardoso   in   2003,   cited   in  
Mendes,   2012,   p.   19)   role   in   GLO   and   public   security.   MINUSTAH   as   well   as  
Pacification  have  actually  led  to  such  efforts  for  preserving  and  sharing  the  experience  
in  exercising  police  tasks,  e.g.  by  dedicated  training  centres  and  doctrine  developments.  
Moreover,  soldiers  in  GLO  operations  meanwhile  enjoy  similar  levels  of  legal  protection  
from   criminal   prosecutions   as   they   do   in   UN   Peace   Operations.   This   certainly   poses  
limits  in  terms  of  accountability,  but  also  has  eroded  grounds  for  military  resistance  to  
being  sent   to  the  domestic  arena.   It  certainly  seems  counterintuitive  that  only  30  years  
after  the  end  of  military  rule,  former  opponents  and  victims  of  the  regime  have  widened  
the   legal  scope  of   internal  military  actions.  Nevertheless,   the  presidencies  of  Fernando  
Henrique  Cardoso  (a  sociology  professor  banned  from  teaching  who  spent  several  years  
in  exile),  Lula  da  Silva  (a  trade  union  activist,  imprisoned  for  leading  a  strike  campaign)  
and  Dilma  Rousseff  (arrested  and  tortured  for  being  member  of  a  guerrilla  group)  have  
constantly   increased   the   significance   of  GLO  missions.   The  populace   largely   supports  
internal  deployments  and  intriguingly  prefers  these  over  sending  soldiers  abroad.  In  a  
survey   carried   out   while   Operação   Arcanjo  was   taking   place,   over   58   percent   of   the  
respondents   considered   “fighting   crime   jointly   with   police   forces”   as   a   mission   the  
Armed  Forces  should  perform.  No  other  possible  answer  achieved  such  high  approval.  
For  instance,  only  34  percent  regarded  the  participation  in  Peace  Operations  as  desirable  
(IPEA,  2011,  p.  16).  The  severity  of  Brazil´s  public  security  problem  and  the  problems  of  
regular  police  forces,  hardly  described  in  this  article,  probably  are  further  driving  factors  
for   the  public  demand:   for   2012,   figures   indicate   29   intentional  homicides  per   100,000  








Brazilian   inhabitants   (Waiselfisz,   2014).  As   a   comparison:   the   annual   figures   for  Haiti  
oscillate  between  5.1  and  6.9  (UNODC,  2012).    
Soldiers´   increased  skills   in  police  tasks,  extended  legal  possibilities,  an  ongoing  
public  security  crisis  and  the  popular  support  all  add  up  to  a  situation  in  which  federal  
and   state   governments   alike   pragmatically   opt   for   the   arguably   fast   and   effective  
solution   of   resorting   to   soldiers   instead   of   attempting   an   arduous,   albeit   necessary  
process  of  police   reform.   In  Rio´  Pacification,   this  militarised  model  of  public   security  
has   so   far   hardly   achieved   sustainable   results.   The   transition   from   military-­‐‑backed  
occupations   to   the   provision   of   services   by   regular   police   forces   and   state   agencies   is  
harder  than  supporters  of  the  Pacification  programme  had  wished  for.  Even  years  after  
the  official  ending  of  Operação  Arcanjo,  the  Army  still  maintained  a  presence  in  the  area  
(Hoelscher   &   Norheim-­‐‑Martinsen,   2014,   p.   965).   The   Complexo   do   Alemão   is  
furthermore  one  of  the  several  already  “pacified”  zones  that  are  considered  for  renewed  
coercive  “consolidations”  by  BOPE  and  other  police  forces  (V.  Cunha,  2014).  Significant  
resistance  from  local  drug  gangs  has  recently  led  to  an  increase  in  the  numbers  of  killed  
police   officers.   In  Maré,   the  military   suffered   the   first   casualty   on  home   soil   since   the  
fight   against   the   Araguaia   guerrilla   in   the   1970s.   Conservative   commentators   have  
consequently   accused   the   commanders   of   placing   soldiers´   lives   at   risk   by   accepting  
arguably  far  too  lenient  rules  of  engagement  (Defesanet,  2014).  Conversely,  members  of  
the   “Pacification   Force”   were   supposedly   following   these   very   rules   of   engagement  
when  they  shot  and  hurt  the  passengers  of  a  car  (one  of  them  an  Air  Force  sergeant  on  
holiday)  that  did  not  obey  an  order  to  stop  at  a  checkpoint  (Marinatto,  2015).  Despite  the  
experience   in   MINUSTAH   and   GLO,   striking   the   right   balance   between   friendly  
interactions   with   citizens   and   acting   robustly   while   exercising   police   roles   is   still   a  
contested  domain  for  soldiers.    
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